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Introduction
Starting 22 November 2004 and for more than two weeks, the
whole world witnessed the emergence of the Ukrainian state polity.1 Some
heard the words "Ukraine" and "Ukrainians" for the first time in their
lives; others saw it as the realization of their most sacred dream and the
dreams of their parents and great-grandparents. The famous modern
Ukrainian poetess Lina Kostenko had foreseen this event and described it
in her poetic words:
"And still we live. And that is the greatest miracle,
That this nation has risen once again. "
For those who know Ukrainian history, it truly was a miracle. For
hundreds of years, Ukraine did not have her statehood; as a result,
Ukrainians naturally treated states in which they were doomed to live as
something alien. Ukraine had been divided from the 12th century onward,
either by inner conflicts or by foreign invaders, and parts of Ukraine had
been taken over by different states. The periods of independence were so
short that people hardly had time to realize what they embodied. Those
periods of independence were never completely peaceful. Thus, because
all of the population's energy went into combating outside invaders, little
energy was left to build or even contemplate a common Ukrainian future.
1
 State polity is defined as "an organized society, a state as a political
nation" [L politia f.Gk politeia f. polites citizen f. polis city]. See J. Pearsall and B.
Trumble (eds.), The Oxford English Reference Dictionary (Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 1121.
Against a background of almost a millennium's history of state-
lessness, the mere fact of the revival of a Ukrainian nation seemed a mira-
cle which made people all over the world watch with fascination the
events in Ukraine in November and December 2004.
In this article I shall attempt to answer three questions:
1. What caused the emergence of state polity in Ukraine during
the last weeks of 2004?
2. How did it correlate with the national aspirations of Ukraini-
ans who fought for independence for hundreds of years?
3. Are these two processes two different coins or two sides of
one coin?
The Emergence of State Polity in Ukraine
In November-December 2004, Ukrainians demonstrated to the
whole world — but first of all to themselves — that they constitute the
state polity. For everyone, it was a revelation.2 As Vsevolod Rechytskyi
stated, the "Orange Revolution" evidently proved that Ukrainians were
ready to strive for freedom.3
Having benefited from the Pylyp Orlyk Constitution of 1710 — a
Ukrainian document that was one of the first in the world to define stan-
dards of political and legal thought and to create a division of powers —
as well as the 1918 Constitution of the Ukrainian People's Republic,
which established broad rights and liberties, Ukrainians were bound to be
democratically minded. So, it was only natural that we should have risen
in opposition, when we realized that our right to choose our president in a
free and fair election, guaranteed by the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine as
well as by international human rights instruments, had been so rudely vio-
lated. Thus, the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" proved once again, as
Petro Rabinovych stated, that the modern history of mankind is the history
of struggling for margins of human rights.4
2
 Andrew Wilson used the term "unexpected nation" in relation to
Ukrainians in his book, The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2000).
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 Vsevolod Rechytskyi, Ukrayina: znovu na rozdorizhzhi (manuscript).
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 Petro M. Rabinovych, "Mezhi prav lyudyny (deyaki pytannya zahalnoyi
teoriyi), Ukrayinskyi chasopys prav lyudyny, nos. 3-4 (1997), p. 14.
Probably for the first time in our history, Ukraine has experienced
15 years of peaceful independence since 1991. Throughout 13 of those
years, a few oligarchs robbed their own people by privatizing factories, all
the time reassuring people that they were fortunate to be living in peace.
And we came to accept that as a significant achievement, because
Ukrainians know full well that poverty is nothing in comparison with war.
And the period of peace bore fruit. "Independence provided the space
needed for this nation to grow up at last."5
With the support of the international community and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), a civil society developed in Ukraine.
Opposition politicians, journalists and hundreds of Ukrainian and interna-
tional NGOs have worked actively and consistently to advocate human
rights, freedom of the press and the rule of law in Ukraine. Throughout
those 13 years, it was extremely dangerous to be in the opposition; this
danger reached its culmination before the presidential elections of 2004.
Assassinations of journalists and politicians and the poisoning of Viktor
Yushchenko are only some examples.
However, the perseverance and rudeness of the political powers of
that time were one of the factors which provoked Ukrainians to rise
against a despotic regime. It united people in their resistance to the viola-
tion of their fundamental rights of freedom of elections and dignity.
Ukrainians from the west and the east, from the north and the south, came
together as a single nation on the main Maydan Nezalezhnosti (Independ-
ence Square) in Kyiv and on similar "Maydans" in most of the cities and
villages all over Ukraine. That was the way in which the Ukrainian nation
exercised popular sovereignty and testified its will in the results of the
2004 presidential elections.
It is worth mentioning that, for Ukrainians, gathering on the May-
dan has been a symbol of marking crucial events throughout history:
"There is a revolution at the Maydan near the church" wrote Pavlo
Tychyna.6 However, such a gathering of millions of people from all over
Ukraine in November-December 2004 happened for the first time in our
history.
5
 Matthew Kaminski, "The Birth of Ukraine," The Wall Street Journal
(Europe), 13 December 2004, p. A17.
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 EDITOR: Pavlo Tychyna (1891-1967) is considered one of the major
modern Ukrainian poets.
Another proof of an emerging European civilized state polity in
Ukraine was that the demonstrations were totally peaceful — and yet ex-
tremely effective. To my knowledge, it was a unique event. Nowhere else
in the world has such an event taken place — without one shot being fired
or one person dying. There was no hatred toward opponents, only great
sympathy from the side of Orange protesters for the supporters of Viktor
Yanukovych, who were brought into Kyiv by special buses and trains.
People actually gave them food and warm clothes. Ukrainian efforts in
December 2004 to rid the country of the violations of human rights, dig-
nity and democratic law were very gallant; they also emerged as one of the
most profound movements toward human rights and freedom in western
history — and manifested the emergence of state polity in Ukraine.
Thus, Ukrainian state polity first and foremost emerged as a result
of a struggle for democracy and human rights which had been rigorously
violated by the government: the people used their right to protect them-
selves against the government. This natural liberty which can be asserted
against a tyrannical regime is a core chain in the natural rights theory7 and
has been confirmed into positive law by many states, as well as in interna-
tional instruments.
In a speech delivered to the European Parliament on 15 December
2004, Yuri Andrukhovych, a famous modern Ukrainian writer, stated that
what was going in Ukraine was "a universal historical drama ... a clash
between a society, which, in considerable and additionally most active,
most conscious and most enlightened part, wants democracy, prosperity
and a nation of laws — against a power that with all its strength is trying
to save an authoritarian, neo-totalitarian form of government, so success-
fully and so cynically embodied in reality by all the successor Soviet
Communist regimes in all of the post-Soviet territories (with the exception
of the Baltic countries)."8
In feedback to my article "From the Dream to the Streets of
Kyiv,"9 in which I described events in Ukraine, Americans compared this
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Ukrainian historical endeavor with the spirit of the Founding Fathers who
established American democracy and a free society. People on the May-
dan valued freedom and independence as much as they valued human
rights and, together with the whole world, they perceived what was hap-
pening as a birth (or rather, a rebirth, considering Ukraine's history) of
democracy.
As President Viktor Yushchenko wrote, "The Orange Revolution
proved that individual yearnings for freedom are universal and that the
abuse of public trust can be overcome anywhere."10
National Aspirations of Ukrainians: A Brief Survey
During all the periods of Ukraine's struggle for independence, the
national idea was based on the right of Ukrainians to national self-
determination. Prohibition of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian cul-
ture only increased the efforts of Ukrainians in their struggle for inde-
pendence. Even some ethnic Russian writers started to write or to speak
Ukrainian as a result of this vivid and savage linguacide. In the 1970s, this
struggle was blended with the struggle for human rights, proclaimed in the
1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1975 Helsinki Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other
international human rights acts. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group was cre-
ated in 1976 to implement the Helsinki Accords and focus on human
rights and the rights of Ukrainians as a nation.
One of the peculiarities of human rights movements in Ukraine
was that these movements were never separated from the struggles for in-
dependence and were subordinated to the latter. An example of this is the
feminist movement at the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th cen-
tury, which was called "pragmatic feminism" by Martha Bohachevsky-
Chomiak.11 Although feminism and nationalism target different groups for
protection, women engaged in the struggle for people's rights did not take
10
 Viktor Yushchenko, "A Year on, Ukraine's Democracy is Showing
Results," The Financial Times (22 December 2005).
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 Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Feminists Despite Themselves: Women
in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884-1939 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1988).
into consideration gender discrimination. They thought that gaining na-
tional rights would automatically guarantee gender equality.12
Throughout this very long and painful struggle for independence,
slogans changed from "Ukraine for Ukrainians" (Mykola Mikhnovsky)13
to "Ukraine for its citizens" (Viacheslav Lypynskyi). Lypynskyi tried to
base the Ukrainian nation and state on a non-ethnic foundation and was
criticized for anachronism. Frank E. Sysyn considers that the "Rusyn na-
tion" (Ukrainians) was an exception in terms of political loyalty already in
the early modern Rzecz Pospolita. The absence of a Rusyn state raised the
"Rusyn nation" to the object of political loyalty.14 It was the societal elite
and political culture that, according to Sysyn, gave the impetus and be-
came a model for the modern Ukrainian movement.15
It is worth mentioning thatJLypynskyi saw intelligentsia's natural
role in nation-building as one of mediating between social classes by crea-
tively developing culture and by fostering commitment among the people
to the basic social values that underlie a respect for law.16 Thus, at the be-
ginning of the 20th century in Ukraine — alongside its cultural, social and
legal aspects — the idea of nation-building was already accepted.
As Matthew Kaminski states: "In the end the state born in 1991, to
the world's surprise, reflected that civic as opposed to ethnic definition of
the Ukrainian state."17 "There was no other choice," Kaminski explains,
since this new country stretched from once-Polish Galicia in the west, to
the Russian-dominated industrial Donbas region in the east, and down to
the Crimea, the peninsula once dominated by Tatars. However, this state-
ment on its surface seems too categorical.
The vast majority of inhabitants of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic in the 1920s and 1930s spoke Ukrainian, and the vast majority of
schools were Ukrainian. Even in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, not
12
 Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Bilym po bilomu: Zhinky v hromadskomu
zhytti Ukrayiny, 1884-1939 (Kyiv: Lybid, 1995), p. 10.
13
 Mykola Mikhnovsky, "Samostiyna Ukrayina," in O. Protsenko and V.
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ian by M. Klymchuk), Krytyka, IX, nos. 1-2 (January-February 2005), p. 28.
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 Ibid., p. 29.
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to mention southern ones, Ukrainians constituted a vast majority. Almost
all of the population in Galicia had always spoken Ukrainian. On the other
hand, the modern world contains many states, which cover a much larger
geographic area and are inhabited by many ethnicities, and yet remain na-
tional states.
According to Alia Nastych, the varying degree of Ukrainian iden-
tity throughout the country allows one to distinguish both civic and ethnic
elements in individual self-identification.18 In fact, to a great extent the
Ukrainian state that appeared in 1991 was the result of a national move-
ment of the second half of the 1980s and exhibited ethnic identity through
the Ukrainian state flag (blue and yellow), the emblem (trident) and the
national anthem — as state symbols which have always been symbols of
Ukrainian independence. All but the Communists unanimously accepted
them and, yet, even the Communists voted in 1996 for the Constitution of
Ukraine which incorporated these state symbols.
An important issue for the new state that appeared in 1991 was
that of national (ethnic) minorities — there were more than 100 nationali-
ties within the former Ukrainian SSR. Consequently, it should come as
little surprise that developing an appropriate state policy towards ethnic
minorities was given a high priority by the authorities, to deal both with
the needs and requirements of the national minority populations and to
remove the potential for intra-ethnic conflicts within Ukraine. Among the
first acts of an independent Ukraine were the Declaration of the Rights of
Nationalities (1991)19 and the Law on National Minorities (1992).20
Such state policy was very consistent. The Ukrainian people could
be considered as having had direct experience of being persons belonging
to a national minority — that is, they had been a non-dominant "minority"
in a land which they considered their own.21 This experience, it may be
18
 Alia Nastych, "Nation Building and Minority Rights in Ukraine,"
Master's Thesis (Budapest: CEU, 2000-2001).
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 Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukrayini u XXSt.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i mate-
rialiv (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1994), pp. 474-475.
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 Ibid., pp. 491-493.
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 Antonovych "The Rights of National Minorities in Ukraine: An
Introduction," in Peter Cumper and Stephen Wheatley (eds.), Minority Rights in
the 'New' Europe (The Hague, London, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1999), p. 251.
argued, has, presently and traditionally, helped the Ukrainian nation to
understand the particular problems and concerns of national minorities.22
Already at the beginning of the 20th century, the Ukrainian Central
Rada, or Council, the highest political body of the Ukrainian People's Re-
public, issued the Second and Third Universals (Proclamations) which
guaranteed equality to all national minorities in Ukraine, including the
right to use their native language in dealing with all administrative agen-
cies. The Law on National-Personal Autonomy (1918) granted the right of
persons belonging to a particular ethnic group to organize themselves to
represent their group to the state authorities. At the beginning of the 20th
century, no other European state enjoyed comparable minority protection
legislation.
Indeed, the first Deputy Secretary on Jewish Affairs in the Gen-
eral Secretariat of Ukraine, Moshe Zilberfarb, argued that whereas the
French Revolution declared human rights, Ukrainian Law on National-
Personal Autonomy declared the rights of minority nations."23
However, when Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union, all the
achievements of the Ukrainian nation concerning friendly relations with
national minorities in Ukraine were silenced, and the idea of Ukrainian
nationalism was discredited. "Yet, facts testify that Ukrainian national
liberation movement had never proposed to reach its aims at the expense
of, or against, non-Ukrainian population of the state."24
Obviously, as Andrew Wilson wrote, the Ukrainian state which
appeared in 1991 was shaped as much by the Soviet experience as by the
legacy of the national idea of 1917-1920.25 Moreover, it was also shaped
by its ancient history, starting with Kyivan Rus and the Halych-Volyn
Principality, the Great Lithuanian Principality, the Ukrainian Kozak Re-
public, as well as by the national movements of the 18th-20th centuries. The
"traditional scheme" of Russian history treated the Kyivan Rus state
22
 Zenon Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy. Imperial
Absorbtion of the Hetmanate 1760s-1830s (Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute,
1988).
23
 E. Tsherikover, Antisemitism un pogromen in Ukraine, 1917-1918
(1923), p. 73.
24
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tsel y sredstvo hosudarstvennoho stroytelstva na Ukrayne: zakonodatylnaya baza y
admynystratyvnaya praktyka," in Yetnycheskye y rehyonalnie konflykti v Evrazyy:
Kn. 2 Rossya, Ukrayna, Belorussya (Moscow: Ves Mir, 1997), p. 115.
25
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which appeared in the 9th century on the territory of modern central
Ukraine as the first Russian state. Similarly, the Polish "great narrative"
regarded Ukrainian historical experience as marginal.26 However, Ukraine
wrote its own history — which has been verified by the "Orange Revolu-
tion."
So, Two Coins or Two Sides of One Coin?
On the one hand, the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine defines the
Ukrainian people as citizens of Ukraine of different nationalities (i.e., eth-
nicities); on the other hand, it also includes notions of a Ukrainian nation
and national minorities. Already in the Preamble to the Constitution,
where there is a definition of the Ukrainian people, there is a differentia-
tion between the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian people: "Based upon
centuries-old experience of Ukrainian state-building and upon acknowl-
edgement by the Ukrainian nation, by all the Ukrainian people a right to
self-determination ..." Article 11 of the Constitution provides that the
Ukrainian state will promote the consolidation and development of the
Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, and
also the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious iden-
tity of all national minorities and indigenous peoples of Ukraine, including
the Crimean Tartars, the Karaims and the Krymchaks.
Definitely, the correlation between "nation" and "people" in the
Ukrainian legislation is that of the part and the whole, of specific and ge-
neric notions. The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of authority
in Ukraine under the Constitution are the people, who exercise their power
directly or through bodies of state authority and local self-government.
The Ukrainian people are the owners of the soil, the subsoil and other
natural resources within the territory of Ukraine.
The usage of the term "the people" (narod) to define a nation is
not new. Not only Ukrainians, but also Belarusians and Poles have tradi-
tionally used this term to define a nation (Lat. gens or natio). These terms
historically were used to define language and cultural communities, i.e.,
ethnic communities, not political nations.
However, in international law, such terms as "the people" and
"the nation" have different generally used meanings. It is due to the strong
26
 Kohut, "Roots of Identity. Studies on Early Modern and Modern
Ukraine" (translated into Ukrainian by S. Hrachova), Krytyka (2004), p. 294.
feeling of unity and solidarity, as well as to the realization of its national
identity, that a people turn into a nation — which, after having created its
state polity, turns into a political nation. Both the 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as well as the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights proclaim the right of all peoples to self-determination
(article 1). The same term is used in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The 1975 Helsinki
Final Act obliges the participating states to respect the equal right of all
peoples to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external
political status, without external interference, and to pursue, as they wish,
their political, economic, social and cultural development (article VIII,
paragraph 2).
According to E. Gelner, nationalism loans its symbolism from the
healthy, spring-clean, active life of peasants — Volk, people.27 It was only
after the French Revolution that the people (narod) started to be identified
with nation.28 In 1919, Symon Petlyura wrote that after two years the
Ukrainian people turned into a nation. Obviously, what is called "the
Ukrainian people" in the Constitution of Ukraine should have been called
"a political nation" (state polity). On the other hand, when the Constitu-
tion of Ukraine was adopted in 1996, there was no state polity in Ukraine;
thus, probably without realizing it, the creators of the Constitution used a
very accurate term — the people (narod).
Obviously, the Ukrainian term "natsiya" as we use it, meaning an
ethnic nation, does not correspond to the English term "nation," meaning a
political nation, a state. Correspondingly, the term "nation-building state"
has as its equivalent "the state which creates a political nation." In terms
of the Ukrainian Constitution, a nation-building state in relation to
Ukraine means "the state which creates Ukrainian people" as a political
nation of the Western type.
Such Ukrainian state polity (the Ukrainian people in terms of the
Constitution) has emerged after the "Orange Revolution." The Legislature
regulates the issues of state language, state holidays and state symbols. A
majority of Ukrainian citizens, as the revolution demonstrated, do identify
themselves as Ukrainians. On the other hand, ethnic Ukrainian identifica-
27
 E. Gellner, "Nations and Nationalism" (translated into Ukrainian) in
Natsionalizm: Antolohiya, p. 309.
A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London and Southampton:
Camelot Press Ltd., 1971), p. 191.
tion remains an issue for a big part of the Ukrainian ethnos, which is not a
surprise after hundreds and hundreds of years of denying the national
identity of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian language and culture.
Since people have been exterminated for their national consciousness, the
revival of Ukrainian self-consciousness will take time.
Final Remark
Every speech by Yushchenko on the Maydan during the "Orange
Revolution" concluded with the words "Glory to each of you!", "Glory to
Ukraine!" and "Glory to God the Father!" and all on the Maydan sang the
national anthem ("Ukraine's glory and freedom have not yet perished"),
followed by a spiritual patriotic song ("Almighty and only God, protect
Ukraine for us"). While singing these, millions on the Maydan placed
their hands on their hearts, thus recognizing Ukraine's state symbols and
acknowledging their political loyalty to Ukraine. Yushchenko and other
leaders of the "Orange Revolution" addressed all citizens of Ukraine, irre-
spective of ethnicity, religion or language. Thus, they appealed to their
political loyalty and invited them to consider Ukraine's state language and
culture as they consider their native language and culture. In the end, this
is the only way that Ukrainian state polity can exist and prosper.
